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A LIFE WITHOUT AFFECTS AND PASSIONS: KANT ON THE 
DUTY OF APATHY
Paul Formosa
An apathetic life is not the sort of  life that most of  us would want for ourselves or believe that we have a duty 
to strive for. And yet Kant argues that we have a duty of  apathy, a duty to strive to be without affects (Affecten) 
and passions (Leidenschaften). But is Kant’s claim that there is a duty of  apathy really as problematic as it sounds? 
I shall seek to answer this question in the negative by, in sections one to four, investigating Kant’s account of  
affects and passions. There I will show that an affect is a short-lived eruption of  feeling that temporarily robs 
you of  your capacity for reflection and a passion is a persistent inclination that is so motivationally powerful 
that it makes governing yourself  on the basis of  reasons very difficult or even impossible. Finally, in section 
five, I shall defend the duty of  apathy against internal and external critiques. While Kant’s distinction between 
affects and passions has been examined before,1 albeit more briefly than I do so here, the duty of  apathy itself  
has not yet received the detailed defence that it deserves given its central importance to Kant’s understanding 
of  virtue. However, I will not be seeking to give a complete account of  either Kant’s theory of  virtue (including 
inner freedom) or the role of  emotions in Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole since this would require another 
paper.2 The aim here is to investigate the duty of  apathy specifically as it relates to affects and passions and, by 
focusing on the details of  this duty, to shed some new light on these broader issues. 
Kant’s distinction between affects and passions, on which the duty of  apathy is based, first appears in preliminary 
form in Kant’s Latin oration, On the Philosophers’ Medicine of  the Body (1786). The first detailed published version 
of  this distinction, which Kant follows without significant amendment in his later works, appears in the Critique 
of  the Power of  Judgment (1790). The distinction reappears in Religion within the Boundaries of  Mere Reason (1793) and 
plays an important role in The Metaphysics of  Morals (1797) and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of  View (1798). 
But the clearest illustration of  the significance that this distinction has for Kant can be found by examining 
his account of  virtue in The Metaphysics of  Morals. There Kant defines virtue as an “aptitude” of  a person’s 
“will” to “determine oneself  to act through the thought of  the law.”3 This aptitude is the “the capacity and 
considered resolve to withstand ... what opposes the moral disposition within us.4 It is thus a type of  fortitude 
which constitutes a state of  “character” which is “noble” and this requires “being one’s own master in a given case 
... and ruling oneself  ... that is, subduing one’s affects and governing one’s passions.”5 Kant calls this requirement 
the “duty of  apathy” and this duty forbids “him to let himself  be governed by his feelings and inclinations.” 
But affects and passions are, respectively, feelings and inclinations which are so powerful that they govern us. 
Therefore the duty of  apathy requires that we strive to be in a state free from both affects and passions.6 But 
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what are affects and passions? 
1. WHAT IS AN AFFECT? 
Affects are sudden, strong, powerful, and short-lived storms of  feeling, or internal motion, against which we are 
passive. Affects are thus “momentary, sparkling phenomenon”, like a “tempest” which “quickly subsides.”7 But 
an affect is not merely momentary, it is also powerful. An affect is “rash, that is, it quickly grows to a degree of  
feeling (Grade des Gefühls) that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtlessness [or imprudence] (unbesonnen)).”8 
Kant elaborates: “it is not the intensity of  a certain feeling that constitutes the affected state, but the lack of  reflection 
in comparing this feeling with the sum of  all feelings (of  pleasure or displeasure).”9 As such, it is not the strength 
or power of  the feeling per se that turns a feeling or emotion into an affect proper, but whether or not that 
eruption of  feeling temporarily robs you of  your capacity for reflection on that feeling. Clearly not every feeling or 
emotion reaches “the strength of  an affect.”10 This explains why Kant says that in “a violent, suddenly aroused 
affect (of  fear, anger, or even joy), the human being is ... beside himself ... he has no control over himself.”11 We 
are beside ourselves because we are robbed of  the power to reflectively control ourselves. But because an affect is 
only temporary it “does [only] a momentary damage to freedom and dominion over oneself.”12
This implies that “every affect is blind, either in the choice of  its end, or, even if  this is given by reason, in its 
implementation; for it is that movement of  the mind that makes it incapable of  engaging in free consideration 
of  principles, in order to determine itself  in accordance with them.”13 An affect is blind because it does not 
allow for reflection on what ends are worth pursuing or what means to those ends are best. For example, to 
help someone from the affect of  sympathy would be to help them right away under the sudden influence of  an 
overpowering feeling without even the capacity for a moment’s reflection as to how best to help them. This is different 
to the case in which an emotion or feeling of  sympathy prompts you to reflect, or leaves you able to reflect, on 
whether to or how best to help another.
To fill out this account of  affects we shall need to look in detail at the many examples of  affects that Kant gives 
in the texts, noted above, in which he makes the distinction between affects and passions. In On the Philosophers’ 
Medicine of  the Body Kant lists joy, indignation, astonishment, and fear and hope (such as people experience in 
games of  chance) as affects and notes that during the “sports and jests of  conversation ... the enthusiasm and 
exertion of  the conversationalists rises to the limits of  an affect.” These affects or “inward motions of  the mind” 
can be “healthful”, “provided they do not reach the point of  enervating it [the mind],” since they “produce a 
good deal of  stimulation that can help the ailing body.”14
In the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment Kant notes that affects of  the “courageous sort” include anger and 
“enraged” despair and affects of  the “yielding kind” include despondent despair.15 “The emotions (Rührungen) 
that can reach the strength of  an affect” include both the “brave” and “tender” emotions, where tender 
emotions are affects which involve a “tendency” to “oversensitivity”, such as a “sympathetic pain that will not 
let itself  be consoled.”16 We are told “sorrow (not dejected sadness) can be counted among the vigorous affects if  
it is grounded in moral ideas, but if  it is grounded in sympathy ... it belongs merely to the mellowing affects.”17 
Gratification, that which “pleases in the sensation”, “can rise to the level of  an affect.”18 In games of  chance 
“the affects of  hope, of  fear, of  joy, of  anger, of  scorn ... are so lively that as a result the entire business of  bodily 
life, as an inner motion, seems to be promoted, as is proved by the cheerfulness of  mood that is generated.” 
In this case “the affect ... moves the viscera and the diaphragm” and promotes “the feeling of  health.”19 Kant 
also lists laughter, longing, astonishment, and admiration as affects.20 In The Metaphysics of  Morals Kant lists the 
affects of  enthusiasm, which he calls sympathy for what is good, and anger, which he contrasts with the passion 
of  hatred.21 
Kant’s most detailed account of  the affects is in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of  View. There Kant defines 
an enthusiast as a visionary who habitually fails to compare his imaginings with the laws of  experience and 
“does so with affect.”22 “Dementia accompanied by affect is madness,”23 and “madness accompanied by fury 
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(rabies), [is] an affect of  anger (toward a real or imaginary object).”24 “Anxiety and confusion between hope and 
joy” are affects which are part of  “the play of  opposed affects by which the conclusion of ” a theatrical piece 
“advances the life of  the spectators” through having “stirred up motion within [them].”25 “Compassion with 
the misfortune” of  one’s “best friend” can be an affect.26 Exuberant joy “which is tempered by no concern 
about pain,” overwhelming sadness “which is alleviated by no hope”, and grief  “are affects that threaten life.”27 
Fright, astonishment, anger, shame, and anxiety are all listed as affects. “Laughing with affect is a convulsive 
cheerfulness” and “weeping accompanying the melting sensation of  a powerless wrath against fate or other 
human beings” is an affect.28 Courage can be an “affect”, as opposed to “genuine bravery (strength of  virtue)” 
which is “aroused by reason.”29 Laughing and crying are affects by which “health is promoted mechanically by 
nature,” and anger is an affect which can also be a “fairly reliable aid to digestion.”30
Many affects are clearly sudden and automatic responses to surprising stimulus which elude conscious control, 
at least initially. Fright, for example, “is merely a state and accidental disposition, dependent for the most part 
merely on bodily causes, of  feeling not prepared enough against a suddenly arising danger.”31 Kant gives the 
following example of  fright: “when the unexpected approach of  the enemy is announced to a commander 
who is in his dressing gown, this can easily stop the blood in the ventricles of  the heart for an instant.”32 Kant 
also notes that affects cause (or coincide with), not only physiological changes, but also characteristic facial 
expressions. For this reason it “is difficult not to betray the imprint of  an affect by any [facial] expression,” 
since even “painstaking restraint in gesture” or “tone” will betray the presence of  the affect that one tries to 
conceal.33 Kant hypothesises that certain characteristic “gestures,” which are expressions of  different affects, are 
“established by nature” because they are common to human beings of  all cultures and climates.34
However, some “physical feelings are related to the affects” but are not affects, such as “shuddering,” “shivering,” 
“dizziness and even seasickness.”35 Although Kant is not explicit about this, presumably the reason that he thinks 
that shivering, shuddering, dizziness, and seasickness are mere feelings that cannot be affects is that these are not 
intentional states, states directed at something.36 A person is startled by something, angry at someone, and so on. 
As such, different affects and emotions are not characterised simply (or even) in terms of  feeling different, but 
instead (or also) in terms of  different intentional objects. For example, for Kant the object of  astonishment is 
something whose novelty exceeds expectation, whereas the object of  admiration is something that astonishes 
us even when the novelty is lost,37 although both probably feel more or less the same. This is part of  Kant’s 
approach to thinking of  affects and emotions both from a “physiological point of  view,” in terms of  the internal 
motions of  blood and fluids, and also “psychologically,” in terms of  a person’s feelings and intentional states such 
as desires and inclinations.38
At one point Kant suggests that emotions and affects are felt responses to things which “gratify” and “please in 
the sensation” or “pain” and displease in the sensation. This explains why our judgments and emotions do not 
necessarily coincide and thus why emotions cannot be judgments. Kant explains: 
A sensation can even displease the one who feels it (like the joy of  a needy but right-thinking person 
over the inheritance from his loving but tightfisted father), ... a deep pain can still please the one who 
suffers it (the sadness of  a widow at the death of  her praiseworthy husband), ... a gratification can in 
addition please (like that in the sciences that we pursue) or a pain (e.g. hatred, envy, or vengefulness) 
can in addition displease us.39 
Judgements and emotions (as well as affects) do not necessarily coincide because what we approve or disapprove 
of  in judgment “rests on reason” (Kant calls it “satisfaction in rational judging (Vernuftbeurtheilung)”), whereas 
what gratifies or pains in sensation “rests only on the feeling or the prospect (whatever its basis might be) of  a 
possible state of  well- or ill-being.”40 But what we feel bears on our well- or ill-being may or may not coincide 
with a conception of  well- or ill-being which we rationally approve of. 
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This divergence between emotions/affects and judgments allows Kant to explain how a “right-thinking” 
person can feel the affect of  joy when hearing of  his father’s death. He feels joy because of  the inheritance he 
will receive, which he needs very much because of  his father’s “tightfisted” nature, even though he rationally 
disapproves of  feeling joy on such an occasion. In this case the person’s affect tracks a felt understanding of  his 
well-being, of  what is important to him, whereas his rational judgment tracks the justifiable and appropriate 
emotional response in such circumstances. Of  course, judgment and feeling also converge when we rationally 
approve of  our pain, as in the case of  the widow who approves of  her grief  at the loss of  her husband, and 
when we rationally approve of  our gratification, as in the case of  the person who approves of  the pleasure they 
gets from their scientific achievements. 
2. CONTROLLING THE AFFECTS
Since affects are not themselves failures of  willing for which we are directly responsible they are not vices, but 
merely a lack of  virtue. Kant explains: 
Reason says [in regard to affects], through the concept of  virtue, that one should get hold of  oneself. Yet 
this weakness ... coupled with the strength of  one’s emotions (Gemüthsbewegung) is a lack of  virtue and, 
as it were, something childish and weak, which can indeed coexist with the best will (besten Willen).41 
An affect is not the sign of  a corrupt or ill will. This is because an affect is something that happens to you, not 
something that you do. But while we are not responsible for having individual affects, we are responsible for any 
failure to cultivate a noble character as required by the duty of  apathy, and failure on this front is not compatible 
with the best will.
However, our feelings do not necessarily follow our rational judgments, and thus simply revising our judgments 
won’t necessarily change our feelings. But we can gain some control over our affects through practices of  
habituation and reinforcement. While Kant is well-known for claiming that a duty to have feelings is “an 
absurdity”,42 since we cannot feel things at will, this is perfectly compatible with there being a duty to habituate 
ourselves to have, or not have, certain feelings, because habituation is a matter of  will. As such, it is not morally 
bad on an individual occasion to have inappropriate feelings, such as a lack of  sympathy for your friend’s loss,43 
since what you feel on any particular occasion is not a matter of  will. But it is morally bad not to have attempted 
to cultivate appropriate feelings through habituation and reinforcement.
Kant takes beneficence to be an important example where habituation is at work. He argues that if  “someone 
practices it [beneficence] often and [has] success in realizing his beneficent intentions, he eventually comes 
actually to love the person he has helped.”44 By acting to benefit others you can gradually habituate yourself  
to have feelings of  love for others. Another of  Kant’s favourite examples of  habituation is that of  polite social 
interaction. Through becoming accustomed to treating people with respect and love in polite social intercourse 
you can gradually habituate yourself  to feel respect and love for others.45 In this way you can cultivate yourself  
to have the feelings appropriate to your duties to other persons. Similarly, Kant argues that we should not avoid 
places where the poor are to be found, or shun sickrooms and debtor’s prisoners, in order to “cultivate the 
compassionate natural (aesthetic) feeling in us” as an indirect means “to sympathy based on moral principles 
and the feeling appropriate to them [my italics].”46 
While it is often noted that Kant sees feelings of  sympathy as indirectly valuable means, though unreliable 
ones, to beneficence based on principle, what is not usually noted is that Kant also sees feelings of  sympathy as 
appropriate emotional responses to the suffering of  others. In general, for Kant feelings can be not merely motivational 
backup for a will which is not reliably moved by considerations of  reason alone, but also appropriate responses 
on the part of  sensibility to principles, people and situations. This is clearest in the case of  the feeling of  
respect for the moral law which is an appropriate emotional response to consciousness of  that law.47 In the 
same way, love and respect for others and oneself, compassion, sympathy, and moral feeling are all appropriate 
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emotional responses to the absolute worth, grounded in universal principles, of  rational persons. We have a 
duty to cultivate and strengthen these feelings through a process of  habitual reinforcement. But while we can 
make progress in this regard, this practice cannot ensure that we never have inappropriate feelings. 
As well as habituation, which involves general patterns of  feeling, Kant also examines the power we have to 
intentionally strengthen individual feelings into affects or to intentionally fail to prevent this. For example, Kant 
talks of  a person who “lets [my italics] a lively sympathy even for what is good rise into an affect.”48 How does one 
let this happen? Kant’s clearest example of  this process is that of  a rich man whose servant “clumsily breaks 
a beautiful and rare crystal goblet.” If  this man “were to compare this loss of  one pleasure with the multitude 
of  all the pleasures that his fortunate position as a rich man offers him” then he “would think nothing of  this 
accident.” However, if  he “now gives himself  over completely to this one feeling of  pain ... then it is no wonder that, 
as a result, he feels as if  his entire happiness were lost.”49 Kant’s point is not that the rich man should not feel the 
loss of  his prized goblet, but that he should not intentionally give himself  over completely to this one feeling. The 
rich man’s happiness has not been ruined and to feel that it has is to be insensitive to the many other pleasures 
and opportunities that his wealth affords him.
But what of  the case where we have lost, not a goblet, but a life-partner or child? In that case it would be 
appropriate to feel immense grief. Kant cautions, not against feeling grief, but against “the grief  that someone 
broods over intentionally, as something that will end only with his life.” Such a person “has something pulling 
on his mind ... [But] what cannot be changed must be driven from the mind.”50 The problem is not with this 
person feeling grief, but his intentional brooding on this one feeling to the extent that it becomes an overpowering 
sorrow that will end only with his life. His happiness may indeed be ruined, but there are other things of  value 
besides his happiness, such as the dignity and happiness of  other persons, and he should not completely and 
permanently neglect these valuable things, even in feeling.
Kant is sensitive to the role that imagination and conscious attention can play in both intensifying and 
diminishing the strength and duration of  feelings.51 This concern leads Kant to focus “on the power of  the 
human mind to master its morbid feelings merely by a firm resolution.”52 The method for mastering these 
feelings involves drawing our attention away from the offending feeling. Kant gives the example of  someone 
suffering a feeling of  “uneasiness” who “goes on, despite this claim of  his inner feeling, to his agenda for the 
day ... he leaves his oppression (which is then merely local) in its proper place ... and turns his attention to the 
business at hand.”53 In this example the man does not brood over his feeling or imagine all the illnesses that it 
could be a sign of. Instead he carries on with his agenda and does not turn a local feeling, one among others, 
into a global feeling or affect which masks the importance of  everything else. This represents Kant’s general 
“Stoic remedy of  fixing my thought forcibly on some neutral object” in order to divert “attention from” some 
sensation, which has the result of  dulling the force of  that sensation.54 However, Kant recognises that not all 
feelings can be mastered directly by this method.55 Further, many affects, such as anger at being poked in the 
back, are immediate and automatic bodily responses to surprising stimuli. They are not the result of  anything 
we intentionally do, such as brood on a feeling, and so cannot be prevented by this method.
 Finally, Kant also recognises that preventing and controlling affects will be easier for some people and harder 
for others due to differences in temperament, with the phlegmatic person in particular having the “support of  
nature” when it comes to fulfilling the duty of  apathy.56 Kant thinks, on the basis of  the humoral physiology of  
his day, that the constitution of  a person’s “blood mixture” and other fluids is the primary determinant of  his 
or her temperament. This leads him to hypothesise that there are exactly four “simple temperaments” which 
result from four types of  blood mixtures, heavy, light, cold, and hot.57 The light-blooded sanguine is particularly 
susceptible to affects but, due to their thoughtlessness, is unlikely to develop passions. The hot-blooded choleric 
is susceptible to both affects and passions, especially ambition. The heavy-blooded melancholic and the cold-
blooded phlegmatic are both less susceptible to affects, but due to their thoughtfulness and persistence are 
susceptible to passions.
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3. WHAT IS A PASSION?
Kant defines a passion as “a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination.”58 While affects are temporary 
and a species of  feeling, passions are lasting and belong to the faculty of desire. However, although passions, along 
with inclinations and desires, belong to the faculty of  desire, they are not desires but very strong inclinations.59 
A desire is an intermittent and temporary source of  motivation, whereas an inclination is a habitual desire. An 
example of  a desire is a temporary thirst for water. Once satisfied, the desire disappears. An example of  an 
inclination is a standing and persistent desire to care for someone you love. But how does a passion differ from 
an inclination? Kant defines passions as “inclinations that make all determinability of  the faculty of  choice by 
means of  [rational] principles difficult or impossible.”60 Elsewhere Kant says that “above inclination” there is 
“another level of  the faculty of  desire, passion ... or an inclination that excludes mastery over oneself,”61 and an 
“inclination that can be conquered only with difficulty or not at all by the subject’s reason is passion.”62 A passion 
therefore is an inclination which is so motivationally powerful that it makes governing yourself  on the basis of  
reasons very difficult or even impossible.
By emphasising that passions are desire-like and not feeling-like, Kant means to account for the persistent 
nature of  passions. Although a passion is a species of  desire and not a feeling, a passion is often connected 
with feelings, including affects. A person who, for example, maintains a passionate hatred for his rival over a 
long period of  time does not always feel hatred, even though his passion, his hatred, does not wax and wane 
but remains persistent. Of  course, his passion may also give rise to, or be connected with, intermittent feelings 
of  hatred when, for example, he sees his hated rival in the street. Further, being persistent and not temporary, 
passions do not tend to cause (or involve) characteristic facial expressions and bodily movements in the way that 
affects do. This is why Kant calls affects “honest and open”, whereas passions are “deceitful and hidden.”63 
To get a fuller understanding of  Kant’s account of  the passions we need to turn to his examples of  passions. 
Outside of  Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of  View Kant mentions only a few passions, such as hatred, 
vindictiveness, “visionary rapture”, envy, “addiction to power” and avarice.64 In Anthropology Kant tells us that 
grief  and shame are passions, although shame is only a passion if  it involves “tormenting oneself  persistently 
with contempt.”65 A “desire for vengeance” can be a passion and even when “it seems to have disappeared, a secret 
hatred, called rancour, is always left over.”66 The permissible desire for justice, which is “based on an idea,” can 
be transformed into “the passion for retaliation, which is often violent to the point of  madness.”67 What Kant 
calls the “inclination of  delusion” can also become a passion, especially when applied to “competition among 
human beings” in the form of  the passionate addiction to the playing of  games, including gambling.68 Even a 
“good-natured desire”, such as “beneficence, is still ... morally reprehensible, as soon as it turns into passion.”69 
The “social inclination often becomes a passion.”70 Finally there is “ambition” which is the “ruling passion” of  a 
person with a choleric temperament.71
Kant divides the passions into passions “of  natural (innate) inclinations and passions of  inclination that result 
from human culture (acquired).”72 The natural passions include “the inclination of  freedom and sex, both of  which 
are connected with affect.” The acquired passions include the “manias for honour, dominance and possession, which 
are not connected with the impetuosity of  an affect.”73 The manias of  culture all involve seeking power and 
influence over others. Honour aims at influencing others through their opinion of  you, domination through their 
fear of  you, and acquiring possessions allows you to influence others through their self-interest.74 Kant also claims 
that we should think of  passions as manias or addictions (sucht), a point which is clear in the terms Kant uses for 
the passions for honour (Ehrsucht), revenge (Rachsucht), and dominance (Herrschsucht).75 
While passions are connected with reason, passions are without exception irrational. A passion “takes its time 
and reflects, no matter how fierce it may be, in order to reach its end.”76 As such, a passion “can be paired with 
the calmest reflection” and “can even co-exist with rationalizing.”77 For example, under the influence of  the 
passion of  vengeance I may reason calmly and correctly about the best means for revenging myself  against my 
hated enemy. I may even be able to rationalise my end (as opposed to rationally justify it) by telling myself  that I 
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am seeking justice, not vengeance. But even so, my passion still makes me irrational in at least one of  two senses: 
first, because it makes me imprudent and, second, because my end cannot be rationally justified. 
Passions make us imprudent because, due to their overwhelming motivational force, they prevent us from 
rationally comparing the worth of  one inclination with the sum of  all our other inclinations. And such 
imprudence is irrational because Kant takes it to be a principle of  “sensibly practical ... reason” that we “not 
please one inclination by placing all the rest in the shade or in a dark corner.”78 But a passion is an “inclination 
that prevents reason from comparing it with the sum of  all inclinations in respect of  a certain choice.”79 As such, 
a person with a passion pursues “part of ” his happiness as if  it were “the whole.”80 Kant’s example of  ambition 
illustrates this point. The “ambitious person” still 
Wants to be loved by others; he needs pleasant social intercourse with others, the maintenance of  his 
financial position, and the like. However, if  he is a passionately ambitious person, then he is blind to 
these ends, though his inclinations still summon him to them, and he overlooks completely the risk he 
is running that he will be hated by others, or avoided in social intercourse, or impoverished through 
his expenditures.81    
By acting, as a result of  his passion, in a way that prevents him from meeting his own conception of  happiness, 
the ambitious person is acting irrationally and imprudently. Whereas affects are irruptive motivational states 
which burst in on our goals and plans, passions work by hijacking our goals and plans.
But passions are not only imprudent, they are also, Kant claims, “without exception evil as well.”82 In order to 
defend this claim Kant needs to show that all passions involve disrespecting the absolute worth of  persons. One 
reason to think that not all passions do this is that some passions are directed at things and not at persons and 
therefore cannot involve disrespecting persons. Kant tries to deal with this case by claiming that passions, unlike 
inclinations, are “always only desires directed by human beings to human beings, not to things.”83 But Kant’s 
own example of  the passion or mania for possessions, and in particular for money, is an example of  a passion 
which has a thing as its object, money.84 Other examples include passions for gambling, drugs and alcohol. Are 
such passions really immoral?
Some passions are directly immoral, such as the passion for domination, because they directly involve 
disrespectfully using other persons as mere means. However, other passions, particularly those directed at 
things, such as gambling, drugs or alcohol, are not directly immoral. But they are indirectly immoral for the same 
reasons that passions are imprudent, namely because they blind us to the worth or value of  things besides our 
passion. And passions can make us blind not only to things which have prudential value but also to things which 
have moral value. Things which have moral value include the pursuit of  the morally obligatory ends of  self-
perfection and the happiness of  others, as well as the fulfilment of  moral duties, including the positive duties of  
beneficence, gratitude and sympathy (not to mention the duty of  apathy itself). But a person under the sway of  
a passion, even one not directly immoral, will tend to be insensitive to moral value and therefore will tend to be 
negligent in the pursuit of  morally obligatory ends and in the fulfilment of  positive moral duties. For this reason 
passions, without exception, make us immoral, either directly or indirectly, as well as imprudent.
4. CONTROLLING THE PASSIONS
Kant notes that since passions are different to affects, they require a different “method of  prevention” and a 
different “cure.”85 However, for a person currently under the sway of  a passion, prevention is already too late 
and there is no straightforward cure. This is because a passion is such a powerful and persistent inclination 
that it can “be conquered (bezwingliche) only with difficulty or not at all by the subject’s reason.”86 A passion 
“prevents [or hinders] (verhindert) reason from comparing it with the sum of  all inclinations in respect to a certain 
choice,”87 and it is therefore an “inclination that excludes (ausschließt) mastery over oneself.”88 However, there are 
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preventive measures you can undertake to stop your inclinations from turning into passions in the first place, as 
well as methods for slowly weaning yourself  off  existing passions.
In discussing one method of  cure and prevention Kant argues that “nothing is accomplished by using force 
against sensibility in the inclination; one must outwit them and ... surrender a barrel for the whale to play with, 
in order to save the ship.” Kant’s example of  this is overcoming an “inclination toward idle rest” by “playing 
with the fine arts, but most of  all through social conversation.”89 Whereas in dealing with affects we need only 
shift our focus from the feeling and wait for it to subside, in dealing with passions we need, because of  the 
persistence of  inclinations, to actively re-engage our sensibility. The best way to deal with a nagging inclination or 
passion is therefore to actively engage in enjoying other pleasures or interacting socially with other people. Kant’s 
passionately ambitious person might, for example, focus on enjoying the pleasures of  social interaction, which 
he also values, in order to gradually lessen the force of  his ambition. A second method involves the long-term 
habituation of  our desires and inclinations so that they correspond with our rational judgments. The process 
for doing this is the same as the process used for feelings and affects, that is, to act as you judge that you ought to 
and, eventually, this will (to some extent) mould your desires and feelings in line with this.90 
Kant is keenly aware of  the way that social pressures can create new desires and gradually reinforce these until 
they reach the strength of  a passion. For this reason Kant lays most blame for the growth of  passions on social 
conditions. He writes:
It is not the instigation of  nature that arouses what should properly be called the passions ... He is poor 
(or considers himself  so) only to the extent that he is anxious that other human beings will consider 
him poor and will despise him for it. Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations 
associated with these, assail his nature, which on its own is undemanding, as soon as he is among human 
beings.91
Here Kant details how social pressures, combined with our predisposition to humanity (the predisposition to 
want our worth as a person publically recognised by others), can habituate us into passions for status, power and 
possessions, as well as promoting passionate envy, ingratitude, and malice.92 For this reason Kant argues that 
moral progress against the passions also requires social progress. To work toward this outcome we need, Kant 
argues, to promote the formation of  a voluntary “ethical community” which will be, negatively, free from the social 
pressures which habituate us into acquiring the cultural passions and, positively, encouraging of  virtue.93 Just as 
certain social conditions can create new passions, different social conditions can help us to overcome passions 
or never acquire them in the first place. This reminds us that the battle we fight against the passions is never 
one we fight in isolation. 
  
5. DEFENDING THE ARGUMENT FOR THE DUTY OF APATHY 
A common way of  contrasting the dispute between Aristotelians and Stoics in regard to the passions is to 
say that the former think that we should moderate our passions and the latter think that we should extirpate the 
passions. Given Kant’s claim that we have a duty of  apathy, a duty to strive to be free from affects and passions, 
it seems that his position is closer to that of  the Stoics than the Aristotelians. But, as should be clear by now, this 
is misleading. While Kant does think that we should seek to extirpate our affects and passions, a task which he 
also thinks that it is impossible to bring to a stable conclusion, he does not think that we should or can extirpate 
our feelings, emotions, desires, and inclinations. What we should seek to be without are very strong, sudden, and 
over-powering feelings, that is affects, and very strong, persistent, nagging, and over-powering inclinations, that 
is passions. We should seek to avoid such immoderate feelings and inclinations since they temporarily (in the 
case of  affects) interfere with and persistently corrupt (in the case of  passions) the exercise of  our inner freedom. 
Put like this, Kantian apathy looks more like an Aristotelian moderation view than a Stoic extirpation view.94 
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But is Kant’s defence of  the duty of  apathy sound? Kant’s core argument for the duty of  apathy runs as follows:
Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to 
bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason’s) control and so to rule over himself, which 
goes beyond [but includes] forbidding him to let himself  be governed by his feelings and inclinations 
(the duty of  apathy); for unless reason holds the reins of  government in its own hands, his feelings and 
inclinations play the master over him.95
The duty of  apathy follows from the negative command of  inner freedom that we not be governed by our 
feelings and inclinations. The positive command is that we govern ourselves on the basis of  reason, and when we 
do this we are positively free and thereby exercise (or actualise) our autonomy.96 But affects and passions are, 
respectively, feelings and inclinations which, because of  their extreme motivational force, make it impossible (or 
at least very difficult) to govern ourselves. Affects and passions therefore tend to govern us. But we have a duty 
to avoid being governed by our feelings and inclinations, and therefore we have a duty to strive to be without 
affects and passions. The duty of  apathy therefore follows from Kant’s account of  freedom and, since this 
account constitutes a core component of  his underlying moral theory, that underlying moral theory positively 
commits Kant to the duty of  apathy. 
Simply having desires, inclinations, feelings, and emotions does not in itself  involve the misuse of, or prevent the 
proper exercise of, our rational faculties of  self-government. This is because these motivational states do not 
force us to do anything. They simply prompt us to consider various courses of  action. This leaves us free to choose 
whether or not to act as we are prompted to.97 As such, it is not a negative requirement of  inner freedom that 
we have no sensible motivating states, no feelings or inclinations, but only that we have no states that we cannot 
govern and therefore which govern us. And affects and passions are precisely those sensible motivating states 
which we cannot (or only with great difficulty) govern. This is why we ought to strive to be without them and 
them alone.
More positively, not only is there no duty to be without governable sensible motivating states (i.e. feelings and 
inclinations), but it would be both wrong and harmful to want to, or attempt to, extirpate these. Kant argues that 
the “natural inclinations” are not the “enemy” since they “merely lack discipline.” Indeed “considered in themselves 
natural inclinations are good, i.e. not reprehensible, and to want to extirpate them would not only be futile but 
harmful and blameworthy as well; we must rather only curb them.”98 Indeed, the feelings and inclinations which 
arise out of  what Kant calls our predisposition to the good are natural motivational states which are positively 
directed “to the good.”99 They motivate us to preserve and maintain ourselves, to seek sexual relations and care for 
our offspring, to seek community and social interaction with other human beings, to pursue our own happiness, 
to want to gain worth in the opinion of  others, and to be susceptible to considerations of  reasons alone.
Since these sensible motivational states are directed to the good it would be blameworthy to even want to be 
rid of  them.100 These sensible motivational states are directed to the good because they help us to survive as 
natural beings, which we have a duty to do, given the role they play in alerting us to needs and dangers and 
motivating us to meet and avoid these respectively. Additionally, without these sensible motivational states we 
could not form any conception of  happiness, because without our inclinations and feelings we would lack the 
material out of  which to develop one. But a world without happiness would be a world that lacked something 
of  great value.101 Further, social feelings and inclinations, along with a desire for social recognition, can play an 
important role in moralising our natures and directing us toward moral ends.102 Finally, being sensibly receptive 
to rational considerations, in the form of  the susceptibility to act out of  “simple respect for the moral law” 
alone, is central to all of  morality for Kant.103 
However, sensible motivational states carry two dangers. The first is that they may tempt us to act otherwise 
than as we ought to. But this is not the fault of  the inclinations or feelings themselves, but of  our own will 
(Willkür).104 Since we maintain our capacity to exercise rational control over our motivational states, it must be 
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that we wilfully fail to properly exercise that capacity. This is evidence, Kant argues, of  our radical self-chosen 
propensity to evil, that is, our dispositional willingness to (at least sometimes) choose otherwise than as we ought 
to when it suits us.105 The second danger is that those motivational states should prove to have a force that is too 
strong or powerful to be overcome (or at least without great difficulty) by our will. This can occur in two ways: 
either because we are subject to a strong emotion or feeling which temporarily robs us of  our powers of  rational 
reflection, or because we are subject to a persistent and overwhelming inclination which makes the proper 
exercise of  self-government impossible (or very difficult), that is, when we are subject to affects or passions. Since 
affects and passions, each in their own way, make being rational impossible (or at least very difficult), it follows 
that we ought to strive to be without affects and passions insofar as they disrupt the exercise of  rational self-government. 
One way to try to avoid this conclusion would be to argue that affects and passions are not states that make 
the exercise of  rational self-government impossible (or at least immensely difficult). But this response will not 
work because Kant defines affects and passions as states which make the exercise of  rational self-government 
impossible (or at least immensely difficult). Perhaps the worry is that Kant is wrong to think that we are ever 
subject to feelings or inclinations (whatever we call them) that are so strong that it is impossible (or very difficult) 
to rationally govern ourselves in the face of  them. But this would be a very hard claim to defend as it would 
involve explaining away phenomena, such as fits of  rage (an affect) and overpowering addictions (a passion), 
which clearly seem to belong to this category. 
Thus far we have only considered an internal critique of  Kant’s duty of  apathy. In contrast, the external critic 
is happy to grant that Kant’s underlying moral theory commits him to the duty of  apathy. But, so the worry 
goes, the so-called duty of  apathy is not really a duty at all. This is because, the external critic claims, it is not 
morally obligatory to strive to be without affects and passions. Since Kant’s moral theory commits him to this 
duty there must be something wrong with his moral theory. But why think that there is no duty of  apathy? Of  
course, if  we start from some alternative moral theory, such as utilitarianism, we may think either that there 
is no duty of  apathy at all or that sometimes, depending on the overall consequences, there is no duty to rid 
ourselves of  certain affects or passions. However, the Kantian will not be moved by this since they will reject the 
alternative moral starting point of  such arguments. As such, what we are after here is an external argument that 
starts out from what is, for the Kantian at least, a (more or less) uncontentious moral starting point and arrives 
at the conclusion that it is problematic to claim that there is a duty of  apathy. Is there such an argument? To 
tackle this question we shall break up the duty of  apathy into its two parts, the duty to be without affects and 
the duty to be without passions.
While Kant’s view of  the affects is nuanced, his condemnation of  the passions is unequivocal: “no human being 
wishes to have passions.”106 However, many people seem to want to have passions. A person might, for example, 
be passionate about protecting rainforests, and we would normally take this to be a good thing, or at least not 
morally wrong. But there is nothing wrong on Kant’s account with a passion in this sense. In this sense a passion 
is something that we care very deeply about, not something that makes us utterly irrational by placing all our 
other cares into a dark light. For example, the passionate gambling addict allows his passion (in Kant’s sense) to 
ruin his marriage, break up his family, put him in a state of  poverty, destroy his friendships, and so on. Who 
would want a passion in this sense? In contrast, someone who cares very deeply about protecting rainforests 
may devote a great deal of  her time and energy to this cause. But she does not ignore all her other cares and 
duties. She does not let her passion for rainforest conservation ruin her marriage, career and friendships, or 
stop her from fulfilling her duties.107 While such a person is passionate about rainforest conservation, this does 
not constitute a passion in Kant’s sense. The duty to be without passions does not require that we not care very 
deeply about things, only that we not care irrationally about them. 
But at what point does caring about something turn into a passion or mania (Sucht)? At the point where the 
inclination becomes so strong that we cannot control it and it thereby makes us irrational in the double sense 
of  being imprudent and immoral. This means that there will not always be a clear line between an inclination 
and a passion, because there is not always a clear line between inclinations which we can and cannot control. 
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However, it is not simply acting irrationally or immorally that is a sign of  the presence of  a passion because our 
practical irrationality is often due to our wilfulness and the radical corruptness of  our disposition. But when we 
have a passion we are not badly governing ourselves in regard to our ends, we are not governing ourselves at all. 
This is why passions also make us imprudent and not just immoral.
To illustrate this point consider Bernard Williams’ famous example of  Gauguin. Gauguin abandons his family 
for the sake of  his art. Ignoring issues of  historical accuracy, Williams imagines a Gauguin “who is concerned 
about these claims [of  his family] and what is involved in their being neglected (we may suppose this to be grim), 
[but nevertheless] ... opts for [a life devoted to painting].”108 Gauguin is torn between two things that he cares 
about and, since he thinks that they are mutually exclusive, he opts, on reflection, for one over the other. This 
case is unlike my example of  the passionate gambler. The passionate gambler is not opting, on reflection, for a 
life of  gambling over keeping his family. Offered the choice he would, unlike Gauguin, choose his family over 
gambling. But he is simply pushed along by his passion for gambling and this ends up costing him his family. It 
is one thing, like Gauguin, to decide on reflection that, all things considered, one end is worth pursuing at the 
expense of  all others. It is another thing to, like my passionate gambler, be compelled by the strength of  your 
inclination to ignore other ends that, all things considered, you think that you ought not to ignore. 
Of  course we could imagine another version where Gauguin is simply pushed by his passion for painting to 
abandon his family. It might be that some people might even want a passion if  it gives them the unrelenting drive 
needed to achieve success in some worthwhile field, such as painting or science, even if  it costs them dearly in 
other areas of  their lives. After all, not all passions obviously ruin your life in the way that a passion for gambling 
does. For example, a person who is passionately ambitious, or has a passion for money or dominance over other 
persons, may well lead what we regard, superficially at least, as a successful life. But such a person will fail to 
live prudently and morally because they will fail to govern themselves both in terms of  their own conception 
of  a good life (imprudence) and on the basis of  the absolute worth of  the humanity in themselves and others 
(immorality). While an inclination can lead us to govern ourselves in terms of  a conception of  our own good 
that is at odds with morality, only a passion prevents us from governing ourselves even in terms of  a conception 
of  our own good. And what good reason could we have for wanting to persistently lose control over ourselves in 
this way? 
Even if  Kant is right about the passions, is he also right about the affects? What is wrong with occasional bouts 
of  intense affect, such as moments of  overpowering joy? While it might be good to be without some affects on 
some occasions, can it really be that we should strive to always be without all affects? Further, given that Kant 
recognises that affects sometimes have both prudential and health benefits, is it really morally required that we 
strive to be without even prudential and health-promoting affects? Of  course, we need to keep in mind that not 
all emotions and feelings have the force of  an affect and, when they do not, there is no duty to be without them. 
Further, an affect is not simply a strong feeling, but a feeling which temporarily causes you to lose control of  
yourself  and which makes reflection impossible. Still, even granting all this, might there not be moments when 
it would be good, or at least not wrong, to want to have affects?
But wanting to be in a state of  affect seems to stand in the same relation to inner freedom as wanting to be 
in a state of  slavery stands to outer freedom.109 In both cases we hand over the role of  governing ourselves to 
someone or something else, and that is incompatible with the dignity of  our humanity. But, unlike slavery, a 
state of  affect is only temporary. Does that matter? No, since while you are under the sway of  an affect you 
cannot choose to exit that state at will and, during that time, the affect might govern you by making you to do 
something rashly. And wanting to be in such a state seems to be incompatible with properly valuing the absolute 
worth of  your humanity.
But not every affect is the same and not every affect is likely to result in rash action. It is not surprising that 
Kant’s chief  example of  an affect is anger, because anger can easily lead to the sort of  rash action which, on 
reflection, you would not have chosen and regret having done. But what about other affects? Under the sway 
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of  the affect of  sympathy you suddenly hug your grieving friend, under the sway of  joy you jump up in the 
air, under the sway of  sorrow you weep uncontrollably, and so on. These actions and bodily movements are 
spontaneous expressions of  your affects and on refection you may not regret having expressed them. Indeed, to 
be always trying to stifle such expressions seems both harmful and wrong. Does the duty of  apathy require this? 
Must every action go through the filter of  rational reflection, even spontaneously jumping with joy?
I think that Kant’s answer to these questions is, or should be given his broader theory, in the negative. This is 
because the moral importance of, for example, jumping with joy is negligible. This consideration leads Kant, in 
the very section in which he defends the claim that “virtue necessarily presupposes apathy”, to warn against 
the “fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be morally indifferent ... and strews all his steps with duties, as with 
mantraps ... Fantastic virtue is concern with petty details which, were it admitted in the doctrine of  virtue, 
would turn the government of  virtue into tyranny.”110 While Kant’s examples of  fantastic virtue involve making 
a moral issue of  whether “I eat meat or fish, drink wine or beer, supposing that both agree with me,”111 given 
that this warning occurs in the context of  Kant’s discussion of  apathy, it is reasonable to suppose that Kant 
is also thinking about feelings and affects when he issues this warning. Indeed, the very point underlying the 
warning against fantastic virtue is that, of  course, not every action and bodily movement should be made into 
a moral issue. A concern with the morality of, for example, jumping with joy, a fantastic concern to ensure that 
every action or bodily movement always goes through the filter of  rational refection, no matter how insignificant, 
is a form of  self-tyranny, not reasonable self-government.
Kant’s primary moral concern is not with sudden affective responses to our environment, such as jumping back 
with fear, or with the sort of  spontaneous expression of  emotional states in our face and voice which is essential 
to proper social interaction. What Kant is morally concerned with is virtue and noble character. This is why 
apathy is not about a “lack of  feeling” or “subjective indifference with respect to objects of  choice”, but about a 
rational engagement with value. As such, apathy is different “from indifference because in cases of  moral apathy 
feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling only because respect for the law 
is more powerful than all such feelings together.”112 Moral feelings are indicative of  “taking an interest” (or 
disinterest) in an action or its effects because it is morally demanded (or forbidden).113 Moral feelings are therefore 
based on sensitivity to a particular sort of  value, namely moral value, including the absolute worth of  persons. 
A person with properly cultivated moral feelings will not feel (or feel strongly) the force of  her emotions when 
they prompt her to do something that is morally forbidden because she will be more emotionally sensitive to the 
higher worth to which her moral feelings are appropriate responses.
The duty of  apathy is therefore a duty which aims at preventing very powerful subjective states from making 
us insensitive to things we judge rationally to be of  most value. The person who is sensitive to what is of  most 
value does not get carried away about the worth of  any one good in isolation from other goods. They do this by 
cultivating their moral feelings, habituating themselves to have emotions and desires which are in accordance 
with their rational judgments, and controlling and limiting (where possible) strong feelings and inclinations by 
employing the techniques outlined in previous sections. This is all part of  the virtuous agent’s “considered and 
firm resolution to put the law of  virtue into practice.”114 Such an agent has engaged in reflection about what 
is worth doing and, as a result, has a practical commitment to her own happiness within moral bounds, to the 
pursuit of  the obligatory ends of  self-perfection and the happiness of  others, and to the fulfilment of  her moral 
duties. The virtuous agent is concerned with strong, sudden, temporary gusts of  feeling only insofar as these are 
likely to actively interfere with these practical commitments. Where they do not have any bearing on these commitments, 
the virtuous agent knows that she need not worry about them, morally speaking. 
Once we properly appreciate this point, the intuitive concerns that motivate the external critic of  the duty of  
apathy lose much of  their force. For example, Patricia Greenspan questions “the familiar ideal” of  apathy on 
the grounds that “the emotions may often be useful to us ... for instance, in social communication – as long as we 
can control their consequences.”115 But Kantian apathy requires, not the sort of  detachment which Greenspan 
finds problematic, but the sort of  self-government which she finds appealing.
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6. CONCLUSION
The virtuous agent is keenly aware that the activity of  self-government must not descend into tyranny and 
an exaggerated concern with petty details. Practical wisdom is required to achieve this practised and ready 
awareness of  what bears on the dignity of  persons, oneself  and others, and what does not. Seeking to prevent 
affects from interfering with this firm commitment to virtue and the proper execution of  this commitment 
is something that we have a duty to do. It is the duty of  apathy. But that duty does not require a petty and 
tyrannical concern with all feelings, even all affects, and the spontaneous expression of  these in actions, such 
as jumping with joy, which do not interfere either with the commitment to virtue or its proper execution. Nor 
does that duty require that we not care deeply about things, but only that we remain capable of  governing 
ourselves in terms of  what we care about. The duty of  apathy is therefore not about preventing the spontaneous 
expression of  emotional states, stopping the movement of  healthy internal motions, or hindering deep affective 
engagement with those people and things we care most about. The duty of  apathy is about preventing powerful 
internal states from hindering a rational responsiveness, in both action and feeling, to moral worth, and other 
forms of  value. Affects and passions are those sensible motivational states that are of  moral and pragmatic 
concern because they are so motivationally powerful that they interfere with such a rational engagement with 
value. The duty of  apathy is the duty to develop a noble character by striving to be without these sensible 
motivational states just insofar as they interfere with the commitment to, and disrupt the proper exercise of, 
rational self-government. 
Finally, some may worry that the duty of  apathy, as I have defended it here, is an uninteresting truism. Kantians 
should welcome this worry. After all, Kant is not trying to invent morality from scratch, but to provide, by and 
large, a rational foundation for common sense morality.116 The more general worry that this paper has been 
addressing is that Kant’s views on the role of  emotions and desires in a moral life are highly problematic and at 
odds with common sense morality. Insofar as I have shown, at least in regard to the duty of  apathy, that this is 
not the case, the argument here has achieved its goal.117
PAUL FORMOSA is a Research Fellow in the Department of  Philosophy at Macquarie University, 
Sydney. He has published work on Kant, moral evil, and topics in moral and political philosophy in a 
range of  edited collections and journals, such as: European Journal of  Philosophy, Kantian Review, Journal 
of  Value Inquiry, Contemporary Political Theory, Social Theory and Practice, The Philosophical Forum, Journal of  
Philosophical Research, Philosophy and Social Criticism, and Journal of  Social Philosophy.
PAUL FORMOSA
NOTES
1. See, for example, Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Maria 
Borges, “Physiology and the Controlling of  Affects in Kant’s Philosophy,” Kantian Review 13, no. 2 (2008); Lara Denis, “Kant’s 
Cold Sage and the Sublimity of  Apathy,” Kantian Review 4 (2000); Stephen Engstrom, “The Inner Freedom of  Virtue,” in 
Kant’s Metaphysics of  Morals, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Paul Guyer, Kant’s System of  Nature 
and Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity of  Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); Kelly D. Sorensen, “Kant’s Taxonomy of  the Emotions,” Kantian Review 6 (2002). While Denis’ paper focuses on 
apathy, her discussion largely ignores the role of  passions. Engstrom covers some similar territory but his account of  apathy 
is too brief. Guyer agrees that we have a duty to rid ourselves of  affects and passions but, wrongly, thinks that “Kant does not 
have very much to say about how we can actually do that” (140). 
2. See, for example, Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of  Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Anne Baxley, 
Kant’s Theory of  Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Patrick Frierson, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000).
3. Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of  Morals,” in Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
6:407. Hereafter MM.
4. MM, 6:380.
5. MM, 6:407.
6. In the quoted passage from the last paragraph of  XV Kant implies that the “duty of  apathy” concerns both affects and pas-
sions since he explicitly refers to both feelings (to which affects belong) and inclinations (to which passions belong) which govern 
us. However, in the next section Kant refers to “moral apathy” as the “absence of  affects” only without referring to passions 
(MM, 6:407-09). In one text Kant says that apathy “consists in freedom from ... passions” alone, which he then differentiates 
from affects (PMB, 15:940), and in another text, without however mentioning apathy or affects, Kant says that we must “clear 
away the passions” (LP, 9:486). As such, Kant is not completely clear whether the duty of  apathy is supposed to cover both 
affects and passions. But since he thinks that there is a duty to be without both and since his definition of  apathy as freedom 
from being governing by both feelings and inclinations implies both, I will take the duty of  apathy to imply freedom from 
both affects and passions. A similar claim is made in Engstrom, “The Inner Freedom of  Virtue”, 310. See Immanuel Kant, 
“On the Philosophers’ Medicine of  the Body,” in Anthropology, History, and Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 15:940. Hereafter PMB. And Immanuel Kant, “Lectures on Pedagogy,” Anthropology, History, and Education (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9:486-87. Hereafter LP.  
7. MM, 6:407-09.
8. Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of  View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7:252. Hereafter 
AP.
9. AP, 7:254.
10. Immanuel Kant, Critique of  the Power of  Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:273. Hereafter CJ.
11. AP, 7:166.
12. AP, 7:267.
13. CJ, 5:272.
14. PMB, 15:940, 949.
15. CJ, 5:272. 
16. CJ, 5:273.
17. CJ, 5:276.
18. CJ, 5:331.
19. CJ, 5:331-32.
20. CJ, 5:178, 272, 332.
21. MM, 6:409.
22. AP, 7:202. 
23. AP, 7:203. 
24. AP, 7:220.
25. AP, 7:232.
26. AP, 7:253.
27. AP, 7:254.
28. AP, 7:255.
29. AP, 7:257-58.
30. AP, 7:260-61.
31. AP, 7:255.
A LIFE WITHOUT AFFECTS OR PASSIONS  
32.AP, 7:256.
33. AP, 7:300-01.
34. AP, 7:301.
35. AP, 7:263-64.
36. See John Deigh, “Primitive Emotions,” in Thinking About Feeling, ed. Robert C Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 9-15.
37. CJ, 5:272.
38. AP, 7:286.
39. CJ, 5:331.
40. CJ, 5:331. 
41. MM, 6:408. 
42. MM, 6:401.
43. As Denis claims: Denis, “Kant’s Cold Sage and the Sublimity of  Apathy,” 63-4
44. MM, 6:402.
45. AP, 7:282; MM, 6:473.
46. MM, 6:457. My italics.
47. Immanuel Kant, “Critique of  Practical Reason,” in Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
5:73. Hereafter CPR.
48. MM, 6:408-09. My italics.
49. AP, 7:254.
50. AP, 7:236.
51. PMB, 15:939, 944.
52. Immanuel Kant, “The Conflict of  the Faculties,” in Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 7:98.
53. “Conflict”, 7:104.
54. “Conflict”, 7:106-07.
55. “Conflict”, 7:112.
56. “Conflict”, 7:254; CJ, 5:272.
57. AP, 7:286-87. 
58. MM, 6:408.
59. Note that a desire is just one type of  incentive, along with inclinations and passions, that belong to the faculty of  desire. As 
such, the faculty of  desire is broader than just desires. 
60. CJ, 5:272.
61. Immanuel Kant, “Religion within the Boundaries of  Mere Reason,” Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 6:29. Hereafter R.
62. AP, 7:251.
63. AP, 7:251-52.
64. CJ, 5:272, 275; MM, 6:408, 426; R: 6:93-94.
65. AP, 7:255.
66. AP, 7:270.
67. AP, 7:271.
68. AP, 7:275.
69. AP, 7:266.
70. AP, 7:277.
71. AP, 7:289.
72. AP, 7:267.
73. AP, 7:268. See also R: 6:93-94.
74. AP, 7:272.
75. AP, 7:266. 
76. AP, 7:252.
77. AP, 7:265.
78. AP, 7:266.
79. AP, 7:265.
80. CpR, 5:73.
81. AP, 7:266.
82. AP, 7:267. 
83. AP, 7:268.
PAUL FORMOSA
84. This is why, unlike the manias for honour and dominance, Kant says that the mania for possessions is “not always morally 
reprehensible.” AP, 7:274.
85. AP, 7:251.
86. AP, 7:251.
87. AP, 7:265.
88. R, 6:29.
89. AP, 7:152.
90. MM, 6:402.
91. R, 6:93-4.
92. See: Paul Formosa, “Kant on the Radical Evil of  Human Nature,” The Philosophical Forum 38, no. 3 (2007).
93. R, 6:94.
94. See also: Lara Denis, “Kant’s Conception of  Virtue,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul 
Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Sherman, Making a Necessity of  Virtue.
95. MM, 6:408.
96. On the relationship between inner freedom and autonomy see: Engstrom, “The Inner Freedom of  Virtue.” Also see 
Guyer’s account of  autonomy as autocracy in: Guyer, Kant’s System of  Nature and Freedom, 136-41.
97. MM, 6:213.
98. R, 6:57-58.
99. R, 6:26-28.
100. However in the Groundwork Kant says that “it must be the universal wish of  every rational being to [want to] be altogether 
free from them [the inclinations].” Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork of  the Metaphysics of  Morals,” in Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:428. This expresses a negative sentiment toward the inclinations which is 
incompatible with Kant’s later view that it is blameworthy to even want (or wish) to extirpate the inclinations. I suspect that 
Kant changed his mind on this point as a result of  developing the distinctions, which postdate the Groundwork, between Wille 
and Willkür and between passions and inclinations. These distinctions allow Kant to say that every rational being must wish 
to be free, not of  inclinations in general, but of  passions in particular. 
101. CpR 5:110-11. 
102. See: Paul Formosa, “Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good,” Kantian Review 15, no. 1 (2010).
103. R, 6:27.
104. R, 6:57-59.
105. See: Formosa, “Kant on the Radical Evil of  Human Nature.”
106. AP, 7:253.
107. Of  course we could imagine a conservationist who develops a passion for conversation or a gambler who keeps his gam-
bling under control and so does not develop a passion.
108. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 23.
109. MM, 6:406.
110. MM, 6:409.
111. MM, 6:409. 
112. MM, 6:408.
113. MM, 6:399.
114. MM, 6:409.
115. Patricia S Greenspan, “A Case of  Mixed Feelings,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. A O Rorty (Berkeley: University of  Cali-
fornia Press, 1980), 224-25.
116. Samuel Kerstein, “Deriving the Supreme Moral Princple from Common Moral Ideas “ in Kant’s Ethics, ed. Thomas E 
Hill Jr. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).
117. I would like to thank this journal’s two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
